'[T]he nearest relative of someone who died as a result of the conflict in and about
On a sunny Saturday afternoon in October 1993 a bomb ripped through a busy fish-and-chip shop in Belfast, killing ten people and seriously injuring 57 others. Two members of the Provisional IRA had planted the bomb in an attempt to kill members of the loyalist UDA group, who they thought were meeting in the room above the takeaway. The bombers intended to give a warning to those in the fish-and-chip shop, but the bomb prematurely detonated killing one of the bombers, Thomas Begley, and a UDA member, Michael Morrison and his family, as well as seriously injuring the other bomber, Sean Kelly. In 2009 proposals by the Consultative Group on the Past to address the legacy of the Troubles, included a recognition payment for every family who lost a loved one. However, it was met by protests that the family of Thomas Begley and other paramilitaries who were killed would be eligible for the payment, and as a result the proposals were abandoned. 5 The quotes above reflect this contention Recognising who is a victim in the aftermath of mass violence and conflict can be morally and politically controversial, owing to contested narratives of victimhood. The image of victims as 'innocent' is often used to deny victimhood to those who suffered, due to their background or conduct, or to legitimise violence against individuals or groups. 6 In reality individual identities in protracted armed conflicts and political violence can be more complex than the binary identities of victim and perpetrator, where individuals can be both victimised and victimiser over time. 
A. Conceiving victimhood and responsibility
Victimhood and responsibility for victimisation seem diametrically opposed; this section seeks to theoretically map out the two areas under 'innocent' and 'complex' victims. For the purposes of clarity 'innocent' victims refers to those individuals who are not members of armed groups, i.e. civilians, with 'complex' victims denoting those who have been victimised, but are responsible for victimising others, with victims referring to both categories.
Innocent victims
In the real world individuals are not always recognised as victims, owing to prevailing political or moral 'labelling' of who a victim should be and who deserves recognition. 8 The victim label can bestow sympathy, praise, or benefits on an individual as it recognises that they have B.
Constructing reparations for complex victims in times of transition
Reparations are an important part of many transitional justice processes, both in alleviating victims' suffering and to balance concessions and demobilisation packages made to combatants. 38 For victims reparations are important in acknowledging and remedying their suffering, as well as providing more tangible means to improve their quality of life.
39
Reparations in transitional justice can be rooted in diverse goals of accountability, reconciliation and peace building, masking tensions between them in practice. 40 Reparations can also be contentious owing to competing demands, in particular from victims who are seen as key stakeholders due to their suffering. However, victims are at best consultees, not 
Reparations for innocent and complex victims
The latent nature of complex victims in the transitional justice reparations literature can also be explained by them coming into conflict with demands of other victims or public perceptions. implemented by the Comprehensive Reparation Programme (PIR). The CVR defined victims broadly to include those who suffered human rights violations, thereby embracing individuals who belonged to 'subversive' non-state groups. However, the CVR excluded members of subversive groups who suffered harm in armed clashes from reparations, as they took up arms against the democratic government and were subjected to legitimate force by the state.
As such, they were 'victims, but not beneficiaries'. 75 Although such reasoning is compliant with domestic and international law on the use of force and human rights, it presupposed that such force was legitimate. Furthermore, such presumption on the legitimacy of state violence allows state forces to be included as 'victims' in reparation programmes on the basis that they were protecting the community, despite documented widespread and systematic human rights abuses.
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The distinction between state and non-state actors is present in the PIR reparation scheme. The PIR scheme offers both individual and collective reparations, but the delivery of individual reparations has been delayed to identify and exclude members of illegal armed groups. It has taken years to screen applicants to avoid members of subversive groups benefitting from reparations. 77 This approach also risks excluding many individuals in Peru who were wrongly convicted of membership of illegal armed groups, but allow those who were never identified to access reparations. 78 Such a broad distinction prevents vulnerable individuals within such communities to access an effective remedy, such as children who were members of illegal groups at the time. 79 This brings into question the remedial effect and contribution to reconciliation of reparations when they can be a source of victimisation by excluding individuals of grave atrocities.
In contrast to these contexts, discussions on reparations in Northern Ireland in dealing with the past have been virtually non-existent, given the contested nature of which victims 75 where some suffering is deserved and there is no equal value for human life, dignity, and personal integrity. 86 The broad brush of responsibility to exclude acknowledgement of the serious suffering of such individuals, paints over complex identities and experiences of individuals during collective violence. This represents a 'double-bind', which excludes complex victims from reparations on the basis of their responsibility, yet includes state forces without examining their culpability. Accordingly, by excluding complex victims a legal fiction is created where only certain victims in the official narrative of the conflict deserve to benefit from reparations. Perhaps rather than exclusion, alternative perspectives could be considered to learn how responsibility and victimisation of complex victims can be reconciled.
C.

Navigating conflicting identities
Complex identities of victim-perpetrators can be navigated through other mechanisms. This section examines how claims over identity are dealt with through reparations in human rights law and development or services offered to affected communities. The human rights approach comes into sharper conflict with socio-political constructions of victimhood and eligibility for reparations of victim-perpetrators as it is only concerned with the responsibility of the state;
whereas the provision of assistance or services takes a more nuanced perspective. Ultimately these alternative approaches to state administrative reparation mechanisms narrowly construe victim-perpetrators responsibility or over look it entirely. At the same time such alternatives can encourage states to include complex victims in reparation programmes or at least alleviate their suffering through more discreet assistance.
Human Rights and Reparations
Reparations have long been associated in human rights law as remedial measures to 'promote justice by redress'. 87 The UN Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and awarding reparations to such complex victims it would allow the Shining Path to continue its subversive campaign; instead such reparation should be off-set as a debt to those they had victimised. 99 Nonetheless, the Court refused to reduce or prevent reparations to the victims, on the basis that as a human rights court it lacked the jurisdiction to determine the nature and aggravating circumstances of their criminal acts, distinguishing it from a criminal court and determining individual criminal responsibility. 100 Instead the jurisdiction of the Court was to examine the international responsibility of the Peruvian state in fulfilling its obligations under the American Convention, which could not be mitigated by the actions of the victims, owing to the serious nature of the violations. On the one hand this reflects the shortcomings of a human rights court in dealing with internal armed conflicts, which go beyond the responsibility of the state and the handful of victims that are able to come before such proceedings to seek redress.
Yet on the other hand, it vindicates the dignity and right to remedy for complex victims that they should not have been subjected to such wrongful atrocities.
Human rights jurisprudence is important in two respects in the difficulty of reparations in providing a just solution in dealing with complex victims: non-discrimination; and state responsibility. With the first issue human rights courts generally follow the principle of nondiscrimination when it comes to holding the state responsible for violating human rights obligations. Thus regional human rights courts generally take a more objective analysis.
However, the right to reparation as vindication of individuals who have been subjected to gross human rights violations is problematic in applying to members of non-state armed groups who are victimised by the state. This leads to the second issue that human rights courts struggle with their one-dimensional jurisdictional reach as enforcing the obligations of the state, preventing it from examining the responsibility of private individuals and groups. This inability to distinguish the responsibility of complex victims could cause political strife, as only a handful of victims are able to access regional human rights courts, causing an imbalance between is examined when it comes to reparations. Although this complex approach is likely to increase the administrative and evidential workload of reparation mechanisms, it helps to neutralise, or at least manage, contested identities and redress in a reasoned and remedial way.
D. Conclusion
As transitional justice has traditionally been rooted in accountability we hold onto simplistic can be crafted to deal with complex victimisation and stave off the return to violence.
